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1 INTRODUCTION
An important class of hardware faults is transient
bit-flips. They can result from external disturbances like
power supply instability in industrial applications or as cos-
mic radiations in space applications [1]. Some recent stud-
ies claim that transient and intermittent faults are becoming
also a problem in general purpose groundbased systems.
[2] and [3] show that the advances in semiconductor tech-
nology, like smaller transistor and interconnect dimensions,
lower power voltages, and higher operating frequencies
have contributed to increased rates of occurrence of tran-
sient and intermittent faults. It is expected that fault toler-
ance features initially devised for critical systems will have
to be embedded into commercial-off-the-shelf systems in
the future.
 Systems with high dependability require high lev-
els of costly redundancy. A focal point of research is thus
the search for techniques that require less redundancy while
maintaining high levels of dependability. Behavior-based
error detection techniques are quite promising in that re-
spect. Several studies have investigated the possibility of
using them to build low redundancy failsilent systems ([4]
[5] [6] [7]). A common conclusion of those studies is that
the crash of a system due to a fault is easy to detect, but
when the system produces some output, it is much harder
to know whether it has been affected by some fault or not.
Techniques like control flow checking or memory
access monitoring [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] do not detect most of
data manipulation errors, nor design faults, because they
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In this paper the behavior of assertion-based error
detection mechanisms is characterized under faults in-
jected according to a quite general fault model. Asser-
tions based on the knowledge of the application can be
very effective at detecting corruption of critical data caused
by hardware faults. The main drawbacks of that approach
are identified as being the lack of protection of data out-
side the section covered by assertions, namely during in-
put and output, and the possible incorrect execution of
the assertions.
To handle those weak-points the Robust Assertions
technique is proposed, whose effectiveness is shown by
extensive fault injection experiments. With this technique
a system follows a new failure model, that is called Fail-
Bounded, where with high probability all results produced
are either correct or, if wrong, they are within a certain
bound of the correct value, whose exact distance depends
on the output assertions used.
Any kind of assertions can be considered, from
simple likelihood tests to high coverage assertions such
as those used in the Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance para-
digm. We claim that this failure model is very useful to
describe the behavior of many low-cost fault-tolerant sys-
tems, that have low hardware and software redundancy,
like embedded systems, were cost is a severe restriction,
yet full availability is expected.
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cannot evaluate the correctness of the output [5]. To do
that we need to have the knowledge of the application in
order to build adequate assertions that verify the com-
putation [6]. Generally, assertions use some property of the
problem or algorithm. For instance, they can be based on
the inverse of the problem, the range of variables, or the
relationship between variables [13].
A practical example of using assertions is the Re-
mote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project that
was developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA.
That project has investigated the possibility of using as-
sertion based mechanisms to detect the errors induced by
cosmic radiation on scientific applications running on state
of the art commercial off the self components and handling
them on the fly [14].
A particular technique based on assertions is Algo-
rithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT), which provides very
effective error detection coverage for linear opera-tions with
matrices [15]. In spite of its high coverage, in [6] [7] it was
shown that ABFT still exhibits some weak points. In this
paper, we present the research we have carried out to better
characterize those weak points, and the mechanisms we
propose to solve them, like protecting data during input/
output and ensuring that the ABFT acceptance tests are
indeed executed. We essentially claim that those mecha-
nisms, collectively called Robust ABFT, guarantee that, if
results are produced by the system, they have been filtered
by the acceptance test of ABFT algorithms with very high
probability.
To justify our claims, we present the results of exten-
sive fault/error injection campaigns on a sequential ver-
sion of matrix multiplication with ABFT using double preci-
sion matrices. The main objective of this research was to
characterize the limits of using assertions in general and
not to quantify the error detection capabilities of any spe-
cific assertion. Several reasons make matrix multiplication
with ABFT appropriate for our study: First, ABFT includes
a high coverage assertion, and thus most of the undetected
errors result from the weakness of the mechanism itself and
not from the weakness of the assertion. Second, matrix mul-
tiplication involves linear transformations over the most
common data structure used in number crunching applica-
tions that is the matrix, and the kind of codification used in
that ABFT can be applicable to any linear operation. Using
large matrices we should expect to get a significant number
of faults that just affect data. The errors produced by such
faults are the ones that other mechanisms have greater dif-
ficulty in detecting. Finally, working with floating point arith-
metic introduces the problem of rounding errors as an addi-
tional weak point of using assertions over real numbers.
Since the acceptance tests of ABFTs are just a spe-
cial kind of assertions, we generalize Robust ABFTs to Ro-
bust Assertions.  To evaluate that new technique we used a
real control application whose output is protected by some
reasonableness checks. Results from extensive fault/error
injection campaigns showed the effectiveness of Robust
Assertions. This technique ensures that the system results
are filtered by the output assertions defined by the pro-
grammer, with very high probability. This means that, even
if the system does output wrong results, they are not arbi-
trary: they are within some "distance" of the correct result,
where the meaning and scope of that "distance" depends
on the particular assertion executed and its detection capa-
bility. A system with such behavior cannot be called fail-
silent [4], but it is a large exaggeration to say it exhibits
Byzantine failure [16], since its behavior is not arbitrary. We
thus propose a new failure model, somewhere between Fail
silent and Byzantine failure, that we call Fail-Bounded. In
other words, although we cannot completely prevent a sys-
tem from delivering wrong results, we can at least say some-
thing about them: they are bounded by the limits imposed
to them by the executed assertions, hence Fail-Bounded.
The structure of this paper is that: section 2 pre-
sents the state of the art in ABFTs followed by the experi-
mental study we have made to characterize the weak points
of ABFT and the mechanisms proposed to handle them.
The "robust assertions" technique is proposed in section
3, as a generalization of robust ABFT to any kind of asser-
tion. Section 4 presents the new failure model and section 5
presents the conclusions.
2. ALGORITHM BASED FAULT TOLERANCE
The basic approach of ABFT is to apply some en-
coding to the input data of the calculation, execute the al-
gorithm on the encoded data, and check that the encoding
is preserved at the end (correctness test). In the original
scheme for matrix multiplication [15], the input matrices are
augmented with an additional checksum row and an addi-
tional checksum column. Each element of the checksum
column/row is the sum of the elements of the original matrix
that are in the same row/column. The augmented matrices
are then multiplied using an unchanged multiplication algo-
rithm - in the end, the additional row and column of the
result matrix should still be the sum of the elements of the
same column or row. If that is not the case, some error has
occurred. Note that we consider "acceptance test" the veri-
fication of the checksum row and column (correctness test)
and the final "if" clause where, in the case the verification
was successful, the output matrix is written to disk, other-
wise an error message is generated (if useful) and no matrix
is outputted.
ABFT schemes exist for a number of algorithms, like
linear operations on matrices, fast Fourier transforms and
iterative solvers for partial differential equations ([15] [17]
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[18] [19] [20]). Their main advantage is the close to perfect
coverage of data errors, in spite of the low processing and
memory overhead. Indeed, in the results presented in [6]
and [7], it was shown that ABFT was able to detect most of
the data errors, especially those that escaped other more
general purpose error detection methods like memory pro-
tection and control flow checking.
Although being a quite effective technique, ABFT
is not perfect. On one hand, whenever floating point arith-
metic is used, as is usually the case for the kind of algo-
rithms where ABFT is applied, difficulties due to round off
error arise. On the other hand, the fault models used to
calculate the coverage of ABFT schemes are not general
enough. The next subsection describes the fault model used
to evaluate the techniques proposed in this work. Subsec-
tion 2.2 identifies the weak points of ABFT and subsection
2.3 analyses the round off problem. Afterwards, the experi-
mental study of the error detection coverage is presented
(subsection 2.4), and some mechanisms to improve that
coverage are proposed.
2.1. THE FAULT MODEL
The original paper on ABFTs considered algorithms
executing on systolic architectures [15], with each proc-
essor calculating a bounded number of elements of the re-
sult matrix so that, if only one processor at a time could fail,
only a bounded number of output data items could be wrong.
The case of a uniprocessor was also considered, but the
fault model assumed was that at most a random number of
consecutive bits of the output could be wrong.
Since then, several works on Graph-Theoretic mod-
els for studying the error detecting and locating capabili-
ties of ABFT schemes have been presented. In [21] is consid-
ered the initial model, where each processor owns only one
data element. The redundant processors, required to check
the calculations, were supposed to be fault free. In [22] the
model is extended to systems where the data elements can
be shared by multiple processors, and [23] [24] studied the
case where the processors computing the checks can fail.
Anyway, all these models assume multiprocessor architec-
tures like systolic arrays, where very good error contain-
ment exists between the several processors involved in the
computation.
In most applications it is expensive to have dedi-
cated processors computing the checks, and the data sub-
set that can be affected by a faulty processor is not so well
delimited. Experimental studies about the error coverage of
the ABFT algorithms designed for general purpose multi-
processors [17] [18] have assumed the following model:
Each processor performs some calculations and checks the
results of another processor, in order to achieve the desired
fault detection and location. A faulty processor can corrupt
all the data it possesses but not the data of another proces-
sor. The processor responsible for inputting the data, col-
lecting and interpreting the results (the host) is considered
fault free. To evaluate ABFT according to that model, per-
manent and transient data errors were simulated: After each
floating point expression an error injection routine was called
to replace, with some probability, the result by a random
word [17] [18].
In the experiments reported in this paper we used a
much broader and much more realistic fault model, corre-
sponding to general transient faults occurring in the hard-
ware. Using the Xception tool [25], bit flips of one bit, af-
fecting only one machine instruction, one processor, and
one functional unit at a time, were injected at random in
both time and space. To be random in time, faults were
injected at any moment during the execution of the pro-
grams under test, affecting both system and application
code and data. To be random in space, the functional unit
where injection was done was also randomly chosen among
Floating point ALU, Integer ALU, Data Bus, Address Bus,
General Purpose Registers, Condition Code Register(s),
Memory Management Unit and Main Memory. Only one
fault was injected in each execution of the programs, with
the system being reset between injections, to start always
from a clean state. This fault model can cause quite varied
and unpredictable results [26]. It is relevant to note here
that only the most subtle type of faults (single instruction
single bit flips) were injected, since other types of faults like
permanent faults and longer lasting transients are easier to
detect, because they have a bigger impact on the system,
and thus are not so demanding on the error detection
mechanisms. The system used to run the experiments was a
Parsytec PowerXplorer, a parallel machine with 4 PowerPCs
601, each node with 8 Mbytes of memory, running Parix, a
parallel OS similar to UNIX. One of the nodes was con-
nected to a host computer, a Sun SPARC-station, that pro-
vides I/O and permanent storage capabilities.
2.2. WEAK POINTS OF ABFT
The programs used in the experiments were a paral-
lel version of matrix multiplication and of QR factorization,
implemented exactly as described in [18], and a uniproc-
essor version of matrix multiplication implemented as de-
scribed in [15], all using double precision floating point
arithmetic. All of them read the input matrices from a file and
wrote the output to another file.
After the random fault-injections, that were used to
collect the statistical results (around 30.000 injections) faults
were injected in a more focused way to help in understand-
ing why did the system in some cases output wrong data.
This very extensive injection campaign uncovered essen-
tially two weak points of ABFT:
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- Data errors can happen outside of the "protection
window" of ABFT, e.g. before the checksum rows
and columns are calculated on the input matrices, or
after the checksum rows and columns are verified
on the result matrix;
- A defective matrix can go unnoticed if the fault in-
terferes with the execution of the acceptance test,
e.g. because of a control flow error that "jumps"
around the conditional branch that finally decides
on the matrix validity. For parallel versions where
the checking processor is different from the one that
made the calculations, this problem can happen in
the processor that acts as host, where all test results
are collected.
These results confirm those of a more limited experi-
ment described in [6] that only used integer arithmetic.
An additional problem that we have faced was that
some faults cause "Not a Number" (NaN) - a special code
used in the IEEE floating point format to signal exceptions
(signal NaN) or to represent the results of certain invalid
operations (quit NaN) [27] [28]. When a NaN is compared
with anything, including itself, it always yields false. We
had to introduce some code to detect them, thus including
an additional assertion.
2.3. ROUNDING ERROR
The correctness test after a calculation using float-
ing point arithmetic cannot be exact because of the finite
precision of that kind of arithmetic. A tolerance interval has
to be calculated for each program using ABFT. The original
approach involves executing the program with several "rep-
resentative" data sets [17], using a tolerance value starting
with zero. Since many false alarms will happen because of
round off errors, the tolerance value is slowly raised until
there are no false alarms. This trial and error method re-
quires a slow tuning, and does not guarantee false alarms
will not arise with other inputs. An alternative technique
was proposed in [29], based on simplified error analysis
techniques where the tolerance interval is calculated in par-
allel with the computation. Since the error analysis is ap-
proximate, the computed tolerance can be some orders of
magnitude higher than the maximum rounding error.
Recently, we have proposed that the tolerance value
should be a parameter that establishes the desired accu-
racy for the solution [30]. Based on the study of the be-
havior of a checksum scheme for some ill conditioned prob-
lems we concluded that besides detecting errors produced
by hardware faults the checksums will also detect whether
the algorithm is able to compute a solution with the speci-
fied accuracy. That proposal is corroborated by the results
presented in [14], where the study of numerical tolerances
for checksum schemes applied to several matrix computa-
tions has shown that if the computation did not succeed,
because the matrix is badly scaled, ill conditioned or nu-
merically unrealistic, the checksum test detects it.
In any case, the most important point to retain here
is that the test is inexact: if erroneous results are produced
because of a fault, they will not be detected if they fall
inside the tolerance margin. We can no longer say that a
particular result is correct, but only that it is within a certain
interval around the correct result.
2.4. IMPROVING THE ERROR DETECTION COVERAGE
The most demanding situation for ABFT usage is
when the whole program is executed on a single processor,
since in that case no processor boundaries exist to define
error containment regions. This is why we will address es-
sentially the uniprocessor case. Besides, if the problem can
be solved for uniprocessors, very low redundancy solu-
tions will be possible, and the generalization for assertion-
based systems will be easier, since the latter are generally
not based on multiprocessors.
We have studied the behavior of a sequential ver-
sion of matrix multiplication, computing the product of
two 200 by 200 double precision matrices with random
entries chosen in the range ( 100, +100). The faults in-
jected were transient bit flips of one bit randomly chosen,
applied to a randomly selected functional unit at a random
instant of time during program execution. In the compari-
son of the checksums vectors we have used a fixed toler-
ance of 10-8. This was the minimum value for which we
didn't get false alarms in the data set used. To classify the
outputs we did a component wise comparison between
the result matrix and a reference solution obtained in a run
with no injected fault. The outputs were classified in one
of the following five categories: 1- wrong result matrix
with error inside the tolerance margin; 2- wrong result matrix
with error outside the tolerance margin; 3- no outputs be-
cause of a crash; 4- no outputs because the program de-
tected an error and does not output the matrix in that case;
5- correct output.
In order to establish the statistical validity of the
data presented in this paper we calculate the upper 99%
confidence limit estimated for the experimental non-cover-
age of the error detection techniques studied. We assume
that the injected faults are representative faults, that is, the
selection probability of each injected fault is equal to its
occurrence probability. Since our experiments are Bernoulli
trials the number of undetected faults,      , has a binomial
distribution with parameters (n,     ), where n is the number
of injected faults and        the non-coverage. Then f/n is an
unbiased estimator for the non-coverage of each mecha-
nism studied. An upper 100γ% confidence limit estimator
for the non-coverage is given by
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,where
is the 100γ% percentile point of the F (Fisher) distribution
with                  degrees of freedom [31].
The next subsection presents the error detection
coverage for the standard version of matrix multiplication
with ABFT. After, subsection 2.4.2 describes the technique
proposed to solve the problem of data corruption outside
the scope of ABFT, and subsection 2.4.3 describes how to
protect the execution of the correctness test and presents
the results that evaluate both techniques.
2.4.1. STANDARD ABFT
We start by characterizing the behavior of the se-
quential version of matrix multiplication without any asser-
tion. Table I shows the outcomes of the experiments. As
can be seen 25.9% of the injected faults originate undetec-
ted wrong outputs outside the tolerance margin. For this
version without assertions, of the 604 errors detected by
the execution system, 91.55% correspond to data excep-
tions, 7.95% are illegal instructions and 0.5% are alignment
exceptions.
Table I - Behavior of matrix multiplication without assertions and with standard ABFT
no. of faults % of total no. of faults % of total
Matrix Multiplication without assertions with standard ABFT
Correct output 1283 45.7% 3719 43 %
No output (crash) 64 2.3% 165 1.9 %
No output (error detected) 604 21.5% 4465 51.7 %
Wrong output (within tolerance) 129 4.6% 136 1.6 %
Wrong output (out of tolerance) 729 25.9% 160 1.8 %
TOTAL 2809 100.0% 8645 100.0%
A second version studied is matrix multiplication with
standard ABFT, in which the checksum vectors are checked
for NaNs before being compared. Table I shows also the
outcomes of these experiments using the same fault param-
eters as before except for the duration of the program that
was adapted to the new situation. We have increased the
number of injected faults to better understand the undetec-
ted errors. As can be seen the results change drastically.
Now, 51.7% of the injected faults produce detected errors.
They are divided among 20.6% that were detected by the
execution system, and 31.1% that were detected by the as-
sertions. The percentage of wrong outputs within toler-
ance is also significantly lower in the ABFT version, be-
cause since the ABFT algorithm is based on row and col-
umn checksums, several under threshold errors in the ele-
ments of a row or column sometimes result in an error in the
checksum that is above the threshold, triggering an error
detection.
Considering that the mechanism fails only when it
does not detect a wrong result outside the tolerance mar-
gin, it only fails at detecting 1.8% of the injected faults.
Estimating the upper 99% confidence limit for the non-cove-
rage,          of this version of standard ABFT, we get a value
of 2.14%. Next, we present the proposals for reducing that
non-coverage.
2.4.2. END-TO-END PROTECTION OF DATA
To solve the problem of data corruption outside the
part of the program covered by ABFT, some error detection
code can be used to protect the data, since data is not
transformed there, just transported. For instance, whoever
generates the input matrices should also generate a CRC of
all their elements. The program with ABFT should then pro-
ceed in the following sequence: read the data, calculate the
checksum rows and columns, and verify the input CRCs. If
it fails, a second attempt at reading the files can be made. If
it fails again probably the input files contain corrupted data
and the program should be aborted. Note that the CRCs
should only be verified after the checksum row and column
have been calculated, otherwise if the matrices would be
corrupted after the CRC verification and before the calcula-
tion of the row and column checksums, that corruption would
go undetected. A similar procedure occurs at the end: the
program calculates a CRC over the result matrix, verifies the
checksum row and column and, if they are correct, writes
the result matrix in the output file together with the CRC. If
the result matrix is somehow corrupted after the verification
of its validity, whoever reads it from the output file will be
able to detect the corruption by verifying the CRC. This
method, illustrated in figure 1, is in fact a direct application
of the end-to-end argument [32]: we have to protect data all
the way, and not just during part of the way.
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Figure 1 – Standard ABFT versus ABFT with end-to-end protection of data.
Standard ABFT
.Read data
.Codify data
.Calculations
.Correctness test
.if ( success )
output results
End-to-end protection of data
.Read data
.Codify data
.Verify input data integrity
.Calculations
.Protect results with CRC
.Correctness test
.if ( success )
output(results + CRC)
acceptance
test
acceptance
test
2.4.3. CHECKING THE CORRECTNESS TEST
The other problem that ABFT algorithms face is the
possible incorrect execution of the assertions. A possible
scenario is, for example, a control flow error that just skips
the whole correctness test, or at least the last “if” clause,
and jumps directly to the “write” instruction where the ma-
trix is sent to disk.
Standard systems have few error detection meth-
ods: essentially behavior based methods like memory pro-
tection and exception traps, with an unsatisfactory cover-
age. There are software based error detection methods (thus
usable on standard systems where no specific hardware
support exists) with very high coverage, like double execu-
tion and assembly-level software-based control flow check-
ing, but they have prohibitive execution time overhead for
most applications.
 Fortunately, ABFT assertions typically account for
a very small percentage of the total execution time (see
table II). Since we just have to protect the execution of the
correctness test, high overhead (but effective) software
based error detection methods can be applied, without any
significant overall performance degradation.
To protect the execution of the assertions a very
simple software-based control flow checking technique
can be used [8] [33]. To understand it, it should be noted
that whoever is going to read the output file will want
to have some mechanism to both know that the matrix is
not corrupted (the CRC gives that assurance), and that
Table II - Execution times of matrix multiplication on a SparcStation 2.
execution time of
standard ABFT
execution time of
correctness test
Matrix
Dimension
execution time
without ABFT
(seconds) (seconds) Overhead (%) (seconds) overhead (%)
200 27.1 27.7 2.21% 0.183 0.66%
500 439 442 0.68% 1.033 0.23%
1000 3551 3563 0.34% 4.150 0.12%
the matrix was indeed checked by the correctness test.
For this second guarantee we propose the double
execution of the correctness test and the use of a
"magic" number, written together with the matrix in the
output file, such as the sum of two unrelated numbers.
This magic number, initially set to zero, will be assem-
bled along the execution of the assertions in such a
way that there is a high probability that at the end, it
just holds the right number if all the assertions were
successfully executed. If the first execution of the
correctness test is successful, the first partial number
is added to it; if the second execution of the test is also
successful, the second partial number is also added to
obtain the magic number. The resulting number is then
written to disk together with the result matrix, using the
same "write" statement. We call this carefully protected
piece of code "gold code" (see figure 2).
When the program using the output file reads it, it
just verifies that the correct magic number is in the right
place in that file (it is independent of the contents of the
matrix). At the end of the acceptance test the magic number
variable is again set to zero. The existence of the magic
number should be as short as possible to avoid an erroneous
usage of it. The partial numbers associated with each
assertion can be assigned freely (see [8]). For the purpose
of this work we just chose numbers such that no number is
the sum of a set of the other used numbers. Instead of
adding the partial numbers to obtain the magic number an
XOR operation can be used as suggested in [34].
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Figure 2 – The “Gold Code”
Initialization: . magic number = 0
... ...
.Correctness test (1st execution)
.if (success1 )
magic number += 1st number
.else
jump to error handle
.Correctness test (2nd execution)
.if (success2 )
magic number += 2nd number
.else
jump to error handle
.if (success1 and success2 )
output ( results + CRC + magic number )
Acceptance
Test
Gold
Code
. magic number = 0
It is the simultaneous use of both the end-to-end
protection of data and the gold code that we call robust
ABFT. In order to determine the effectiveness of this method,
we have injected faults in a third sequential version of ma-
trix multiplication now using robust ABFT. Again the in-
jected faults were randomly distributed during all the pro-
gram execution time. As can be seen from table III, this
version never outputted wrong matrices outside the toler-
ance margin. It is interesting to refer that, for the Robust
ABFT version, of the 4929 detected errors, 60.2% (30.4% of
the total injected faults) were detected by the assertions
and the remaining 39.8% (20.1% of the total) were detected
by the execution system (most of them correspond to illegal
memory accesses detected by the system memory protec-
tion). The 60.2% of errors detected by the assertions can be
further subdivided among 3.3% that were detected by the
data integrity assertion at the beginning of the program,
and thus correspond to data corruption during input, 56.6%
that were detected by the first execution of the correctness
test, 0.3% that were detected by the second execution, and
none was detected by the final assertion that tests if both
executions were successful. As expected, the second ex-
ecution is needed very seldom, and the final test has to be
responsible for the detection of bad results only in very
rare cases, that never occurred in our experiments. Finally,
the upper limit estimated for the non-coverage of errors
greater than the tolerance value,        for this version of
robust ABFT, is 0.05% with a confidence level of 99%.
Table IV summarizes the results obtained for stan-
dard and robust ABFT versions showing the distribution
of detected errors and the upper 99% confidence limits for
the non-coverage of both mechanisms.
At this point it should be clear that the “gold code”
structure can be used to protect any kind of assertion, in-
cluding assertions on the input data.  A completely robust
version of ABFT should also follow the gold code structure
when it verifies the data integrity of the inputs. The gener-
alization of the gold code structure to input assertions will
be presented in section 3.
Table III - Behavior of matrix multiplication with robust ABFT.
robust ABFTMatrix Multiplication
with robust ABFT no. of faults % of total
Correct output 4454 45.6 %
No output (crash) 237 2.4 %
No output (error detected) 4929 50.5 %
Wrong output (within tolerance) 148 1.5 %
Wrong output (out of tolerance) 0 0.0%
TOTAL 9768 100.0%
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Although we did not protect the input assertions in
the experiments presented in table III, none of the results
were out of tolerance. Those results point to a very small
probability that a fault corrupts the data and simultaneously
causes the incorrect acceptance of this data. But the input
data can already be corrupted and due to a second fault the
integrity assertion may not detect the error. The protection
of the input assertion was done in the case of the gás-fired
furnace controller described in the end of the next section
and in [35].
Table IV - Comparison between Standard and Robust ABFT
Matrix multip.
with: Detected errors
Wrong outputs
(out of the tolerance)
total of inject.
faults
% of detect.
errors
by the
exec.
system
by the
assertions
estimate
of C
C upper 99%
confidence limit
Standard ABFT 8645 51.7% 20.6% 31.1% 1.8% 2.14%
Robust ABFT 9767 50.5% 20,1% 30,4% 0.0% 0.05%
3. ROBUST ASSERTIONS
The techniques we have used to make ABFT robust
are quite general and can be applied to any system where
the programmer defines assertions on the output. Let us
consider a general block of code that receives some data,
which can be validated by one or more input assertions,
performs some calculations over this data, and produces
results whose correctness can be evaluated by one or more
assertions. As in robust ABFT, we propose an end-to-end
protection of the data, and gold code protection for all the
assertions performed in such blocks of code.
Supposing that there are n assertions, then each
one is executed twice and the magic number is decomposed
Figure 3 – Robust Assertions
“Structure of Robust Assertions”
.Input data
.Protect/Codify data (to be used in assertions)
.Input assertions
.Calculations
.Protect results with CRC
.Output assertions
.if ( all tests were successful )
Output (results + CRC + magic number)
.magic number = 0
Gold Code for
assertion i
(with i=1,2,...)
.magic number = 0
...
.Assertion i (1st execution )
.if ( success1 )
magic number += (2i-1)th number
.else
jump to error handle
.Assertion i (2nd execution )
.if ( success2 )
magic number += (2i)th number
.else
jump to error handle
into 2n components. As before, the variable associated with
the magic number is initially set to zero and then the magic
number will be assembled along the execution of the
assertions. Generally, for each assertion i, if the first execution
is successful the (2i - 1)th component of the magic number is
added to the variable and if the second execution is
successful the (2i)th component is also added to the same
variable (fig. 3).
Additionally, when deciding on the validity of a par-
ticular output, the assertions can use the values of the inputs
and possibly other internal state variables. With ABFT, the
process of encoding the input data via checksums also
works as a protection of the values that will be used to
check the results. While that codification assures a low
probability that errors in the checksum vectors will mask
independent errors in the results, when considering gene-
ral assertions we have no such guarantee.  Inputs (and
other values) used in assertions must be protected in a
similar way to the outputs, and verified at the end, if we
want to rely on the results of the assertions.
Thus for a general Robust Assertions technique we
propose the following structure, illustrated in figure 3:
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The program, after inputting the data, protects (or
codifies) all the data that will be used in any assertion. Next,
if applicable, assertions on the input are executed following
the gold code structure. Input assertions may include: 1-
verifying a magic number in the case that the data was
previously verified by a robust assertion; 2- verifying the
data integrity in the case that the data was previously
protected; 3- other application specific assertions used to
validate the inputs.
The program proceeds with the main calculation and,
at the end, protects the results with a CRC. Finally, it execu-
tes the output assertions following again the gold code
structure. Output assertions can be: 1- application specific
assertions used to check the correctness of the output; 2-
verification of input data (and possibly other values) used
in previous assertions.
 If the results pass all the tests, then they are output
together with the CRC and the magic number. Afterwards,
the magic number variable is again set to zero.
It could be argued that, under the single fault assump-
tion that was followed in these experiments, the protection
of the correctness test is not relevant, because either the
computation is affected or the test, but not both. Un-
fortunately, we cannot assume that, because we have no
error containment regions. In the course of our experiments
we have witnessed cases where both were affected. In many
such cases the program execution is changed so strongly
that the system crashes and does not output anything, but
in some cases wrong data does come out. This is particularly
true when the main calculation is very simple, as is often the
case in feedback control systems. Still, it is true that under
a single fault the probability of that event is low. But, since
the time cost of the gold code is usually so low, it is worth
the additional assurance it gives. This additional coverage
may be small but it is relevant, particularly when the system
has above 99,9% coverage, as is the case for instance in the
experiments summarized in the table III.
There are two additional reasons to protect the
acceptance test even under a single fault model. First,
assertions can also detect errors due to software faults, and
second, assertions can detect if a correctly designed and
implemented algorithm cannot solve an ill conditioned
problem with the required accuracy [14]. Each of these ca-
ses together with a single hardware fault affecting the
acceptance test can lead to wrong outputs outside the
tolerance margin. Again, although such compound events
have low probability, the very low time overhead of the
gold code is a small price for the additional assurance it
gives.
On the other hand, there are cases where the single
fault assumption is not realistic. A clear example is space
applications subject to cosmic radiation. There, the sce-
nario where several heavy-ions hit the system during a single
execution of a lengthy execution must be considered - see
for instance the NASA REE project [14]. Double faults are
realistic also in programs that manipulate large amounts of
data spending several days or even weeks in the same
computation.
 If a single fault model is acceptable and the overhead
of the gold code is too high, then a simplex execution of the
correctness test can be considered, but will have to be
validated by detailed fault injection experiments to ensure
that the loss of coverage is not significant.
To test the Robust Assertions technique we used a
control application, namely a small industrial controller for
gas-fired pottery furnaces. On the one hand it is typical of
the applications where assertions are common, and on the
other hand we had available the full source code of a
commercial controller, developed by the authors around
1990 and produced and sold by an industrial firm for some
years after that. The "robust assertions" technique was
fully applied to that real PID controller and an exhaustive
study characterizes its behavior under fault injection. After
almost fifty thousands injected faults the upper limit
estimated for the non coverage of the robust controller is
0.009% with a confidence level of 99%. The execution
overhead is 13.83% for 50 000 iterations and 13.76% for 150
000 iterations. As the main program is very simple, the
probability of false alarms due to the introduction of the
robust assertions structure is slightly higher than in the
ABFT case but, as discussed before, the probability that a
fault affects simultaneously the data and the correctness
test is also higher justifying the protection of the assertions.
We get a system with an error coverage above 99,99% and
we think that this result clearly supports the usefulness of
the robust assertion technique. For want of space the details
of that work are not presented here but they are fully
described in the previous conference paper [35].
4. BOUNDED FAILURE
Previous research has shown that it is not possible
to build fail-silent systems using only low-cost and low-
overhead behavior based error detection methods in sim-
plex systems subject to hardware faults [5] [6]. Although
few, some erroneous results do manage to get out. We are
then forced to consider that those systems follow the next
less restrictive failure model, the Byzantine failure model.
Still, usage of that model with those systems makes us feel
quite uncomfortable since, after having examined many of
those erroneous results, we see that they are not arbitrary,
much less malicious. An intermediate failure model might be
of interest in many situations. Based on above reported
research we propose one new model, the Fail-Bounded
model. Subsection 4.1 defines the model and subsection 4.2
justifies its need and applicability.
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4.1. DEFINITION
If we can guarantee that the results of a computation
in a simplex computer are always filtered by an acceptance
test, or assertion, and that the outputs are not corrupted
after being tested by that assertion, (in which case we call it
a robust assertion), we know that the output, even if wrong,
satisfies the invariant tested by that assertion. The ensuing
failures are thus not arbitrary, since the error they exhibit
has an upper bound that depends on the output assertions
used by the programmer. The notion of distance implicit in
the concept of "upper bound" is very general; the
associated metric is completely dependant on the type of
assertion used, and has essentially two values: satisfies
the assertions, or does not satisfy the assertions.
This behavior defines a new failure model that we
call Fail-Bounded:
Definition 1: A system is said to be Fail-Bounded if
it either:
a) produces correct output;
b) produces wrong outputs, but the error they exhibit
has an upper bound defined by output assertions
whose execution is guaranteed;
c) stops producing output (because of a crash or be-
cause an error was detected).
The Fail-Bounded failure model is an intermediate
model between Fail-Silent and Byzantine Failure:
- The Fail-Bounded model becomes the Fail-Silent
model as the error bound becomes zero;
- The Fail-Bounded model becomes the Byzantine
model (in the value-domain) as the error bound
becomes arbitrarily large;
The assertions we consider here can be of any kind.
They can be like the acceptance tests of recovery blocks
[36], but they can also be simple likelihood tests. Obvi-
ously, the stronger the test the smaller is the distance
between an erroneous output and the correct value, and
the more usable will be the system. For a further discus-
sion and examples of assertions see for instance [13], [37],
[38], [39], [40] and the recent papers on software robustness
[41], [42], [43] [44].
4.2. JUSTIFICATION
A certain fuzziness is inevitably associated with the
Fail-Bounded model, since we do not guarantee that the
outputs are exactly correct, but only that they fall within an
interval around the correct value. We contend that this is a
realistic and usable assumption in several classes of systems.
The first type of such systems is number crunching.
People working with numerical algorithms are already used
to that fuzziness, because of the finite precision of floating
point arithmetic. This is exactly what we have seen before
for the ABFT case, where the round-off error required us to
work with intervals of correctness, not exact values. There
is even a branch of mathematics called interval arithmetic,
where calculations with intervals are studied (see for
instance the chapter on "Interval Arithmetic" in [45]). Clearly,
depending on the assertions used, the size of the interval
around the correct value where wrong results fall can be
close to the round-off interval, or it can be substantially
larger. Finding assertions that lead to error intervals
sufficiently small to be usable is an open problem for many
numerical calculations. For those algorithms for which an
ABFT has been developed, or a Result Checker [46] exists,
this is essentially a solved problem.
A second class of systems where Fail-Bounded is a
natural notion is feedback control, like the control appli-
cation referred in the previous section [35]. There we show
that the physical restrictions of such systems can be easily
used to define meaningful assertions, and that the Robust
Assertion technique is easy to apply and effective. Indeed,
in the control of continuous time systems, a certain level of
error is unavoidable, similarly to round-off error in floating
point arithmetic. In fact, control algorithms are designed
precisely to enable the controlled system to go on working
correctly in spite of external disturbances - if these didn't
exist, controlling a system would involve no feedback, just
a device to inform the controlled system of the desired set
point. We claim that, if the error is not too large, an erroneous
output of the controller can be considered just as another
"external disturbance" that will be compensated for by the
feed-back control mechanism. We have studied this
question extensively in [33], showing it to be true. Similar
results were obtained in [47] [48]. We thus claim that Fail
Boundedness fits very well the behavior of feedback control
systems, is very usable and easy to implement.
A third class of systems where Fail-Bounded is mean-
ingful is discrete state systems. For this class, work to pro-
ve the feasibility of the model is not so advanced. An example
that can help clarify the idea is the control of the traffic
lights at a street crossing. If the safety restrictions are met
(e.g., no two crossing lanes have a green light at the same
time, and lights do not change too quickly), it is not relevant
if the standard sequence by which each incoming traffic
flow gets green is changed once in a while. This means that
the system can accommodate changes (errors) in the nor-
mal state sequence, as long as the safety restrictions are
met.
Another relevant question at this point, having
established the relevance of the Fail-Bounded model for
several system classes, is its usability. Can dependable
systems of practical relevance be built on building blocks
that follow this model? In [33] a positive answer is given to
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this question for feedback control systems. In the first part
of this paper a similarly positive answer is given for floating
point calculations. And for distributed systems at large?
Both the Fail-Silent model and Fail-Byzantine model have
proven their worth since many distributed algorithms have
been built on them. Can the same be expected from the Fail-
Bounded model? While this is largely an open research
problem, we can argue that, in many cases, algorithms meant
to be used with the Fail-Silent model can also be applied to
systems with Fail-Bounded behavior. In fact, the previous
description shows that in many circumstances the output
error due to a fault in the system is indistinguishable from
other sources of error the system is prepared to deal with,
or at least the output deviation is not relevant. If the
erroneous outputs resulting from a fault (erroneous in the
sense that if fault free the system would have produced
different outputs) do not fall outside those intervals, those
outputs can be considered correct. Under those conditions,
the Fail-Bounded model then becomes the same as the Fail-
Silent model, and all algorithms that assume Fail-Silence
can be applied to Fail-Bounded systems.
We cannot obviously guarantee that any system
will follow the Fail-Bounded model with 100% certitude, but
the same is true for all other failure models, except for the
Byzantine model. Still, the results presented for robust
ABFT and those obtained for the robust control application
[35] show that the coverage of the Fail-Bounded assumption,
in the sense of [49], can be quite high, thus making it realistic
and usable.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addressed in the first place the problem
of determining the behavior of ABFT techniques under a
more general fault model than has been used to calculate its
coverage in the original papers, and essentially uncovered
two weakpoints: data can be corrupted during input/output
and the correctness tests can be incorrectly executed. In
the same line, and as has already been pointed out in other
works, it is also a problem that the correctness tests cannot
be exact due to rounding errors in floating point calculations.
We proposed simple ways to solve the first two problems,
leading to what we collectively called Robust ABFT, and
showed by fault injection that in spite of their simplicity
they are very effective. The problem of rounding errors
cannot be solved, meaning that we can only speak of the
correctness of the result within a certain error tolerance.
We then proposed a generalization of the Robust
ABFT technique to Robust Assertions, where we essen-
tially try to guarantee that all data output by a system has
been previously filtered by a correctly executed assertion,
with high probability. Results obtained with  a PID con-
troller subjected to fault injection have proved that such a
mechanism is feasible and effective.
This motivated the main proposal of this paper,
namely a new failure model called Fail Bounded, somewhere
between the Fail-Silent and the Fail-Byzantine models,
according to which a system either outputs correct results,
or stops because of a crash or upon detection of an error, or
outputs results that are wrong but within a certain "distance"
of the correct outputs, where this distance is defined by the
output assertions whose execution is guaranteed with high
probability.
Although we argued that in many circumstances fail-
bounded systems can be handled as fail silent systems, it is
still an open problem to determine how usable fail-bounded
systems can be as building blocks for dependable systems,
distributed or not.
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